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*AMENDED BLD-178      NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1481 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  DONNA M. HILL, 
            Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the  
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2-13-cv-01604) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
March 30, 2017 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 5, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Donna M. Hill is the plaintiff in an ongoing civil action that has been assigned for 
pretrial purposes to a Magistrate Judge.  Hill has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus 
directing the District Court to order the Magistrate Judge’s disqualification.  We will 
deny the petition. 
 Hill has filed three motions asking the Magistrate Judge to recuse himself. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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She asserted in her first two motions that the Magistrate Judge’s legal conclusions 
displayed an appearance of partiality.  The Magistrate Judge denied both motions.  Hill 
did not seek review by the District Court or this Court after the Magistrate Judge denied 
her first motion.  After the Magistrate Judge denied her second motion, however, she 
sought review by the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 72(b).  The District Court upheld the Magistrate Judge’s decision not to recuse.  
(ECF No. 64.)   
 Hill later filed her third motion asking the Magistrate Judge to recuse himself.  
That motion arose from a motion that Hill filed to compel defendants to respond to 
discovery.  The Magistrate Judge granted Hill’s discovery motion in part, denied it in 
part, and directed defendants to provide “all relevant, non-privileged information” 
responsive to one of her requests.  (ECF No. 77 at 2.).  According to Hill, defendants then 
refused to provide any documents on the ground that they were privileged.   
In Hill’s third motion for recusal, she argued that the Magistrate Judge displayed 
an appearance of partiality because his reference to “non-privileged information” coached 
defendants to assert a claim of privilege that they had not asserted before.  The Magistrate 
Judge denied that request for recusal too.  (ECF No. 84.)  This time, however, Hill did not 
seek further review by the District Court.  Instead, she has sought review directly from us 
by filing the mandamus petition at issue here.1 
                                              
1 Hill’s specific request is that we issue a writ “ordering the district court to ensure 
petitioner’s right to discovery.”  (Mandamus Pet. at 4.)  Hill makes that request 
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Mandamus is a proper means for us to review a judge’s refusal to recuse under 28 
U.S.C. § 455(a).  See In re Kensington, 353 F.3d at 219.  In this case, however, the 
requirements for mandamus relief are not satisfied and we will deny the petition for two 
reasons. 
 First, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that generally is available only when 
the petitioner has no other adequate means to obtain the requested relief.  See id.  Hill had 
an adequate means of obtaining relief by seeking review in the District Court.  See Cole 
v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 366 F.3d 813, 817-20 (9th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases and denying 
mandamus review of Magistrate Judge’s order disqualifying counsel where petitioner did 
not seek review in the District Court).  Hill’s time to seek such review has expired, see 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); W.D. Pa. Civ. R. 72(c)(2), but that circumstance does not suggest 
that mandamus relief is warranted because Hill could have timely sought review as she 
did before and mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal, see Cole, 366 F.3d 
at 818; In re Kensington, 353 F.3d at 219.2   
                                                                                                                                                  
immediately after raising the issue of the Magistrate Judge’s recusal, however, and she 
does not make any specific discovery related request.  Thus, we understand her petition 
as challenging the Magistrate Judge’s decision not to recuse.  To the extent that Hill may 
be seeking mandamus review of any of the Magistrate Judge’s specific discovery orders, 
mandamus is not appropriate because Hill has not shown that she cannot obtain relief 
from those orders, if warranted, on appeal from the District Court’s final judgment.  See 
In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 219 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 
2 The Court in Cole, in holding that mandamus review of a Magistrate Judge’s ruling was 
not available because the petitioner did not first seek District Court review, distinguished 
our decision in In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 1998).  See Cole, 366 F.3d at 
819 n.9.  In re U.S. Healthcare is distinguishable from the present situation as well.  In 
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 Second, mandamus generally is available only when the petitioner’s right to relief 
is “clear and indisputable.”  In re Kensington, 353 F.3d at 219 (quotation marks omitted).        
Hill claims that the Magistrate Judge should recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  
“The test for recusal under § 455(a) is whether a reasonable person, with knowledge of 
all the facts, would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably questioned.”  
In re Kensington, 353 F.3d at 220.  Hill claims that the Magistrate Judge coached 
defendants to assert a claim of privilege by referring to their obligation to produce “all 
relevant, non-privileged information” in response to one of her discovery requests.  As 
the Magistrate Judge explained in declining to recuse, however, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1) 
expressly limits the scope of discovery to relevant and non-privileged matters.  No 
reasonable person would believe that the Magistrate Judge’s standard recitation of the 
permissible scope of discovery (in granting Hill’s discovery motion, no less) displayed 
any bias or partiality. 
                                                                                                                                                  
that case, a Magistrate Judge entered an unauthorized case-dispositive order remanding a 
matter to state court.  We reviewed the order by mandamus even though the petitioner did 
not first seek review by the District Court.  In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d at 147.  We 
reasoned that the petitioner “has no realistic remedy” other than by mandamus because 
the District Court had adopted a local rule invalidly providing that Magistrate Judges 
could issue case-dispositive remand orders, which suggested that the District Court would 
have rejected petitioner’s argument that the Magistrate Judge’s order in that case was 
unauthorized.  Id.; see also id. at 144 & n.1 (addressing the local rule).  In this case, by 
contrast, there is no local rule suggesting that Hill could not obtain relief in the District 
Court.  To the contrary, W.D. Pa. Civ. R. 72(c)(2) permitted her to seek review by the 
District Court, and Hill was well aware of that fact as evidenced by her decision to seek 
such review before. 
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 For these reasons, we will deny Hill’s mandamus petition.  Hill’s motion to stay 
proceedings in the District Court pending our ruling on her mandamus petition is denied 
as moot. 
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